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x Preface 
and the "corporate liberal'' school of the mid-twentieth century. Tuey show 
how businesspeople might at various points for a range of reasons seek to 
promote a larger government, while at the same time pressing for the inter-
ests of business as a class. These authors are more nuanced in their approach 
to the politics of business than were the Progressives, but are also more skep-
tical about the ideological commitments of businesspeople than were the 
New Left historians of corporate capitalism. Tuey emphasize the role of busi-
ness in shaping a state devoted to furthering the economic interests and 
activities of the private sector. 
Above all, the scholars whose work is collected here suggest the impor-
tance of taking businesspeople seriously as political actors, analyzing the 
variety of w~ys that they have sought to shape public life rather than assum-
ing that they automatically wield political power and always do so in the 
> .. same way. Tuey suggest the difficulties of making generalizations about 
.what businesspeople think, and the coexistence of highly diverse approaches 
to politics in the business world. Tuey portray businesspeople as possessing a 
range of political ideas and trying to use their identities as business leaders to 
advance different political ends. Tue authors look at struggles inside the busi-
community, and even within organizations, such as the National Asso-
'. ciation of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which historians 
'have often: assumed to speak with a single voice. Tuey suggest the necessity 
of paying close attention to government at different levels-oflooking at lo-
cal, urban, and state governments alongside the national polity. Finally, they 
· point to the value of looking closely and carefully at what businesspeople 
actually did, not only at what they said and their explicitly ideological 
pronouncements. But perhaps most of all, these essays call attention to the 
unwieldy but often successful efforts of businesspeople to act as a class, and 
to their various concerted attempts to define and advance their own agen-
das through political engagement. Even as historians deploy the social his-
tory tools developed by specialists in labor, civil rights, and other social 
movements to study business elites, it is important to remember that the 
access these elites enjoyed to economic resources and to the halls of political . 
power set them apart from the social movements that often criticized them. 
Looking at the ways in which businesspeople have mobilized politically, 
and their attempts to build a state that they could trust and control, helps us 
· to move beyond the partisan rhetoric of electoral politics, and teaches us much 
about the history of the twentieth century that otherwise. remains hard to 
fully understand. 
Introduction 
Adversarial Relations? Business and Politics in 
Twentieth-Century America 
Richard R. fohn 
During the past few years, a growing popular awareness of the large wealth 
disparity between the many and the few has helped revive enduring ques-
tions about the relationship between business and politics in the American 
past. Some warn that the wealthiest Americans today have more power than 
ever to rig the game in their favor. Others blame the government for foster-
ing inequality by distorting market forces. Still others deplore the current 
level of inequality as bad for capitalism. No longer does it seem plausible to 
echo the hoary platitude that "a rising tide lifts all boats." It is sometimes said 
that the participants in this debate misunderstand the relationship between 
capitalism and equality.1 Yet no thoughtful observer of American public life 
would deny that the relationship between the business elite and governmen-
tal institutions has often been adversarial, and that this relationship can be 
documented not only in public relations talking points and electioneering 
sound bites but also in the historical record. Even so, questions remain. 
How adversarial has this relationship been? Can it be linked to the wider 
developments in culture, politics, and society? And, if so, how can it best be 
explained? 
. This collection of original essays offers a fresh perspective on these and 
other questions th,at lie at the intersection of business and politics in 
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twentieth-century America. Just as an earlier generation of historians parsed 
the politics of working-class people with imagination and insight, so do these 
historians fix the spotlight on the business leaders who dominated the na-
tion's political economy. 
The essays in this collection-all but three of which were first presented 
at the Hagley Museum and Library, in Wilmington, Delaware, and many of 
which draw on the Hagley Library's extraordinary archival holdings-
explore the engagement of business leaders with governmental institutions 
from a distinctive angle of vision.2 In each essay, the relationship of business 
and politics is a central theme. When our authors refer to business, they are 
primarily concerned with firms that employ large numbers of people and 
with business leaders who exert substantial political power. That 1s, they 
mostly focus on the business elite. When our authors refer to politics, they 
are mostly interested in ideology and public policy, which they understand 
to embrace the enactment and implementation oflaws and regulations at all 
le~els of government: federal, state, and municipal. Unlike so much histori-
cal writing on recent American history, this collection is sensitive ~o politics 
not only in Washington but also in the state house and city hall. 
Elections, legislative maneuvering, and campaign finance are, of course, 
also important to a full understanding of the relationship between business 
and politics in modern America. Yet they are not a main focus of the essays 
that follow. Rather, our authors consider some of the more pervasive, though 
often overlooked, ways in which business leaders::;:_a large and diverse group 
that includes corporate executives, middle managers, independent propri-
etors, trade association representatives, and industry lobbyists-have shaped, 
and have been shaped by, the political-economic rules of the game. Culture 
matters, but so do institutions-and our authors are mindful not only of 
the vital, if often elusive, power of ideology and belief, but also of the often 
hard-edged imperatives of business decisionmaking and political fiat. 
The topics that our authors explore build on a venerable tradition of his-
torical writing about business and politics in the American past. 3 More than 
a· century ago, Charles Beard famously proposed, in his Economic Interpre-
tation of the Constitution (1913), that powerful seaboard merchants had de-
signed the federal Constitution to limit the influence of popular majorities 
on economic affairs. Beard's own understanding of the relationship between 
business and politics is more nuanced than is sometimes assumed. His land-
mark Rise of American Civilization (1927), for example, was suffused with an 
almost utopian faith in the democratic potential of the modern, high-
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technology corporation that, at least in his mind, fit comfortably alongside 
the more mordant critical realism of his Economic Interpretation.4 
Yet it was Beard's people-versus-the-interests dualism, rather than his 
technological enthusiasm, that would capture the attention of his colleagues 
in the interwar period. The enormous power wielded by the "captains of in-
dustry" was inherently illegitimate, or so Beard's progeny assumed, since it 
enabled a self-appointed elite to dominate public life in ways that precluded 
the possibility of a truly democratic politics. The antidemocratic implica-
tions of concentrated economic power furnished a leitmotif for Matthew 
Josephson's Robber Barons, a captivating 1934 potboiler written by a popular 
journalist during the depths of the Great Depression. To document the per-
version of democratic politics by the country's late nineteenth-century em-
pire builders, Josephson recycled a half-century of journalistic editorializing 
that originated not in the rural hinterland, as Josephson disingenuously 
claimed, but in the big-city press.5 More muted in tone, yet basically similar 
in its characterization of the «economic royalists," as Franklin D. Roosevelt 
termed them, was The Politics of Upheaval, an influential overview by the 
Harvard historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., published in 1960, of a critical 
juncture in the New Deal.6 
Historians have long faulted Beard, Josephson, and Schlesinger for their 
almost Manichean, business-versus-democracy essentialism. Yet it should 
not be forgotten that this genre of historical writing-known today as the 
"progressive school" -drew its inspiration from a laudable critical realism 
that in the decades to come .would lead a galaxy of talented historians to 
probe in greater detail-often using archival sources and typically with the 
benefit of insights derived from social theory-the relationships among pol-
itics, democracy, and the business elite. 
The progressive historians typically, assumed that business leaders were 
fundamentally opposed to reform, an assumption that was reinforced by 
their keen awareness of the magnitude of the challenge that Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's Democratic party confronted in the 1930s, when, in response 
to the Great Depression, the party backed legislation to create a new kind of 
«mixed economy" to increase and channel investment, rein in corporate 
prerogatives, strengthen labor unions, and guarantee prosperity. 
The presumption that business and reform were locked in mortal com-
bat would be challenged in the 1950s and 1960s by a constellation of post-
New Deal historians that included Lee Benson, Robert H. Wiebe, Gabriel 
Kollw, James Weinstein, Ellis Hawley, James Livingston, and Martin Sklar. 
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These historians shared the progressives' fascination with the relationship 
between business and politics, a commonality that is sometimes overlooked 
by a later generation of historiographers who drew spurious connections 
between their rejection of the progressives' people-versus-the-interests dual-
ity and the celebration of "consensus" by the cultural historians David Pot-
ter and Daniel Boorstin. Unlike Potter and Boorstin, these post-New Deal 
historians rarely identified themselves as political conservatives: in fact, sev-
eral would become prominently identified in the 1960s with the anties-
tablishment New Left. The post-New Deal historians wrote at the high tide 
of postwar liberalism-an age of wide, though hardly universal, prosperity 
in which one-third of the nation's labor force paid union dues, and the dom-
inant bloc in each of the major parties endorsed legislation to expand the 
size·and reach of federal power .. These historians found it plausible to assume 
that business leaders might well have supported certain laws and regulations 
fuat a foriner creneration would have lauded as "progressive" or "liberal" -
0 
making them, in a felicitous catchphrase conventionally attributed to Sklar 
that would soon do a great deal of historiographical heavy lifting, "corporate 
liberals."7 
Historians who specialized in the New Deal and beyond were by no 
means all of one mind. The presumption that an elite-oriented "corporate 
liberalism" had successfully stifled dissent troubled historians oflabor rela-
tions, who could not help but be aware of the continuing opposition toward 
organized labor in the postwar era of a larg~ andpowerful bloc of business 
leaders. Business opposition to organized labor entered a new phase follow-
ing the enactment of the Wagner Act (1935), an important New Deal labor 
law that established a framework for mandatory collective bargaining.' 
Major fissures in the business community were rooted not only or even pri· 
marily in party affiliation, but also in regionalism, industry structure, and 
business strategy. The significance of these fissures remained contested. If, 
for example, it could be demonstrated that the interests of capital-intensive 
corporations such as DuPont, General Motors, or AT&T exerted dispropor-
tionate political influence, then it might still be plausible to contend that a 
hegemonic corporate liberalism prevailed.9 Not everyone, however, was con-
vinced. In the opinion of David Vogel-an influential political scientist who 
published two landmark studies on the relationship between business and 
politics in the postwar period-the attitude of business leaders toward the 
state remained "uneasy," a characterization that he documented by survey-
ing their words and deeds.10 
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Historians who came of age in the 1990s and beyond, or whose assump-
tions have been shaped by recent events, have also turned their attention to 
the. relationship between business and politics. Troubled by the avowedly 
anti-regulatory and ostensibly pro-consumerist neoliberal critique of the 
New Deal, these historians have been impressed by the undeniable power 
of business leaders in contemporary politics, a predisposition that linked 
them in spirit, if not in method, to both the corporate liberal historians 
of the 1960s and the interwar progressives. For these historians, economic 
inequality is a problem to be explained, and its origins are to be found, in 
whole or in part, in the baleful and disproportionate influence that the 
nation's business elite had come to exert in government, journalism, and 
public life. 
Nowhere is this reassessment more evident than in the burgeoning liter-
ature on the United States and the world. To consolidate power, improve the 
terms of trade, and promote economic development-or so these historians 
contend, building on a long and distinguished tradition of revisionist scholar-
ship in the history of U.S. foreign relations-a coalition of business leaders 
diplomats, and lawmakers shaped the relationship of business and politic; 
overseas. Their activities range from William H. Taft's "Dollar Diplomacy" 
of the 1900s and the creation of the Federal Reserve System ill 1913 to the 
Third World modernization projects of the 1950s, the community development 
programs of the Kennedy era, and the international supply-chain manage-
ment strategy of Coca Cola.11 
The bulk of this still-emerging literature on the relationship of business 
and politics focuses less on the pre-Second World War era-as had been true, 
for example, for Wiebe, Hawley, and Sklar-than on the more recent past. 
In so domg, it often engaged with the ideologically charged critique of the 
New Deal that has become increasingly influential in American public life 
smce the 1970s. This critique improbably recast the history of American busi-
ness through a neoliberal lens: It was not until the 1930s, it is worth recall- · 
ing, that business leaders would launch a publicity campaign to elevate "free 
enterprise" into a cornerstone of the American political tradition.12 Prior to 
this decade, the phrase "free enterprise" had been only sporadically invoked, 
and almost never with the kind of almost superstitious awe with which it 
would, at that time, come to be invested. Business leaders had, of course, 
shaped governmental institutions in many sectors long before the New Deal, 
as, for exa~ple, has been demonstrated in the case o~ public finance by 
Stephen Mihm for the nineteenth-century money supply and Julia Ott for 
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the popularization of stock ownership. that followed the war-bond cam-
paign of the First World Warn Yet the seedbed of neoliberalism would not 
be laid until the 1930s. 
Much of the roost thoughtful and ambitious recent literature on the rela-
tionship between business and politics in the post-New Deal era echoed, if 
in new and compelling ways, themes that had earlier been explored by the 
corporate liberals and the progressives. The launch during the 1930s of a 
business-led "crusade" to dethrone the New Deal-including, by no means 
incidentally, its post-Wagner Act administrative protocols-has been probed 
by David Farber and Kim Phillips-Fein-" The influence of a discernibly "cor-
porate liberal" regulatory tradition on the provisioning of health care was 
canvassed in a similar spirit by) ennifer Klein.15 The decision of post-Second 
World War manufacturers to relocate their factories from .the industrial 
heartland in the Northeast to the South and eventually overseas was the re-
sult of a sustained effort not only to cut labor costs but also to evade labor 
unions, in the opinion of Thomas Sugrue, Jefferson Cowie, and Tami J. 
Friedman." The parallel determination of local boosters to make Phoenix, 
Arizona, a low-wage, nonunion, business-friendly enclave, was documented 
by Elizabeth Tandy Shermer.17 The utter fatuity of early twentieth-century 
economic forecasting, as well as its dubious political legacy, would find its 
historian in Walter A. Friedman.18 
The revival of progressive and corporate-liberal themes and concerns is 
particularly conspicuous in a shelf of new bookg on the relationship be-
tween business and politics in the 1970s and beyond. The myriad challenges 
posed by industrial decline would, in the 1970s, spawn a new kind of highly 
disciplined business lobby, explained Benjamin Waterhouse.19 The furor of 
business leaders toward the unprecedented upsurge in environmental reg-
ulations in this decade heightened tensions between the federal govern-
ment and the business elite, concluded Meg Jacobs-'° The emergence in. the 
1970s of an anti-regulatory neoliberalism, which would gradually morph 
from a critique of the New Deal into a totalistic market fundamentalism, 
would reshape business norms, concluded Kenneth). Lipartito and his col-
leagues in an ambitious four-century survey of the history of corporate so-
cial responsibility.2i The adoption of a raft of free-market-oriented political 
positions-that, as it happens, resonated nicely with the antistatist reli-
gious proclivities of its cadre of first-time female workers-would become a 
central° pillar of the business strategy at Walmart, according to Bethany 
Moreton.22 
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I_n certain instances, the primary catalyst for neoliberalism originated 
not m the corporate boardroom but in Congress and the White House. 
P.olitical choices, rather than market imperatives, best explained the finan-
cial deregulation and deindustrialization of the 1970s, according to Greta 
Knppner and Judith Stein.23 In the case of consumer credit, the primacy of 
politics over business could be traced all the way back to the New Deal, in 
the· view of Louis Hyman.24 
. Many of the historians who have considered the rise and fall of postwar 
liberalism have adopted the lens of political history, a broad and eclectic field 
that ranges widely from ideology and social movements to legislative behav-
ior and public policy. Much of the best recent work in political history has 
focused on public policy, which often builds on the burgeoning political sci-
ence literature known as American Political Development, or APD, a field 
that stresses the path-dependent trajectory of governmental institutions and 
civic ideals, a topic of particular relevance to the themes of this book. 2s 
Quite different in focus is .the rich yet often underappreciated literature 
on the relationship between business and politics that has been published by 
specialists m busmess history. By and large, this literature has contended that 
this relationship has been shaped less by political ideology than by structural 
considerations rooted in the interaction of the firm, the industry, and the 
political economy. 
The current upsurge of interest in business history received a major im-
petus fr~m the publication in 1977 of Alfred D. Chandler, )r.'s, magisterial 
The Visible Hand. To understand why this one book would prove to be so 
important for the field, it is useful to provide a brief overview of the field of 
business history in the preceding fifty years. 
Business history-in sharp contrast to political history-would not de-
velop a compelling intellectual agenda until after the Second World War. 
The self-identity of the field went back to 1927, when Harvard Business 
School appointed its first professor of business history, the same year Charles 
Beard published his Rise of American Civilization, and fifty years before the 
publication of Chandler's Visible Hand. The early history of the field was 
closely linked with the professional training of MBAs, and its practitioners 
were primarily known for their detailed, technically proficient, and rarely 
controversial primary-source research in business archives. Among the 
most notable contributions of the early pioneers was their successful cam-
paign to convince business leaders to open their archives for historical 
research. 26 
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. Prominent early business historians included New Deal liberals such as 
Allan Nevins as well as several anti-New Deal conservatives who were highly 
skeptical of government economic intervention-a consideration that helped 
keep the latter tightly focused on business decisionmaking and the nse (and, 
less frequently, the fall) of a firm, industry, or business sector.27 The books 
and articles these historians published were richly textured, informative, and 
well written; many repay careful reading today. Yet they remained very much 
on the margins of historical inquiry. Little changed until the 1950s, when 
Chandler began to publish a series of influential articles that combined ar-
chival research with insights drawn from social theory. The culmination of 
this research agenda was The Visible Hand. . 
The explanatory scheme that Chandler laid out in Visible Hand grew out 
of his longstanding frustration with the narrow, uninteresting, and badly 
posed questions that political historians, journalists, and even specialists in 
economic history had long asked about businessmen and their world. (The 
term "businessmen" was apt. The field at this time was almost exclusively 
focused on inen, like much of the rest of the historical profession, even though 
· several influential early business historians were themselves women.
28
) To 
debate, as historians in the 1940s and 1950s did, whether business leaders 
had been amoral «robber barons" or visionary «industrial statesmen') -good 
fellows or bad fellows, as Chandler often put it in.conversation-was not only 
a colossal bore but also a missed opportunity. Did it really matter whether 
john D. Rockefeller had been a robber baron or an industrial statesman, as the 
title of a reader aimed at the college history market had asked undergraduates 
to ponder in 1948?29 Might he have bee_n neither, or both? And who really 
cared? 
Biographical factors shaped Chandler's outlook as well. Throughout his 
life, Chandler retained a frank admiration for the innovative potential of 
large-scale, vertically oriented, manufacturing firms such as the Wilming-
ton Delaware-based DuPont Chemical Company.30 Chandler himself was 
no; descended from the du Ponts, his middle name notwithstanding, but he 
spent part of his childhood in Wilmington, where he met many prominent 
business leaders) a circumstance that was somewhat unusual for a profes-
sional historian and one that prompted in him a strong disinclination to 
characterize business leaders as either heroes or villains.31 
For Chandler, innovation and scale .were directly related. Like many aca-
demics of his generation, and not only in history, but also in institutional 
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economics) he firmly believed that the most disruptive innovations-such as 
the discovery of a low-cost form of renewable energy that could free the 
world from fossil fuel-could only originate in large-scale research and de-
velopment facilities: public, private, or in-between. 32 For Chandler, and for 
the many historians who followed his lead, whether an organization was 
public or private mattered less than how it was coordinated, by whom, and 
toward what end. 
Chandlerian business history is sometimes criticized as bloodless and 
value neutral. Nothing could be further from the truth. Having served as 
a U.S. Naval officer in the Second World War, Chandler had a profound re-
spect for the enormous organizational capabilities of the country's industrial 
sector and was firmly convinced that the Nazis would have defeated the 
Allies had the U.S. military not been able to speedily transform the nation's 
factories into an "arsenal of democracy." British firms lacked tl;i.e orga-
nizational capabilities of their Nazi counterparts-a recipe for disaster. And 
a Nazi victory was an outcome from which Chandler, like so many thought-
ful and civic-minded men and women of his generation, quite understand-
ably recoiled." · 
The significance of U.S. military procurement during the Second World 
War was a theme that Chandler touched on often in his teaching, though 
only rarely in print. The fullest statement of his position on this topic can be 
found not in Chandler's own oeuvre, but in a publication by one of his most 
devoted disciples, Thomas K. McGraw. In his brief, engaging, authoritative, 
and eminently teachable textbook, American Business Since 1920: How It 
Worked, McGraw devoted half a chapter to the wartime "production miracle." 
To highlight its significance, McGraw featured on ·the front cover of its first 
edition a photograph of the factory floor of a Douglas Aircraft plant in Long 
Beach, California, that was manufacturing Boeing-designed B-17 bombers 
for the U.S. military. In the second edition, interestingly, and conceivably 
in response to a shifting political climate, this photograph had been re-
placed by a superficially similar, yet, in its ideological import, quite differ-
ent, image of a factory floor of a Boeing plant that was churning out passenger 
airplanes.34 
Like Charles Beard and so many other academics whose mental outlook 
had been shaped by the optimism of the early twentieth-century progres-
sives, Chandler had a deep and abiding faith in the ability of public admin-
istrators and business leaders to work creatively together to promote the 
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public good. It was in this spirit that he contributed a brief yet incisive essay 
to a volume on business and public policy, edited by the labor lawyer and 
former labor secretary john T. Dunlop. Why, Chandler asked at the start 
of his essay, had government and business so often "appeared as adversar-
ies"? To help frame the question, he quoted a DuPont executive who posed 
a question of his own: "Why is it that I and my American colleagues are be-
ing constantly taken to court-made to stand trial-for activities that our 
counterparts in Britain and other parts of Europe are knighted, given peer-
ages or comparable honors?''35 
The international comparative lens through which the DuPont executive 
viewed the American political economy had much in common with the 
intellectual framework that Chandler relied on in Visible Hand. Visible Hand 
was well received in the profession, winning both the Pulitzer and the Ban-
croft prizes. It was and is a theoretically challenging book (though an 
absorbing read), which helps explain not only its staying power but also the 
presumption that it is less often read than cited. Chandler's theme was not 
·the role of business in society-nor even the relationship between business 
. and politics-but rather the evolution of the internal dynamics of the firm. 
Chandler's treatment of this topi.c reached back to the colonial era and for-
ward to the mid-twentieth century. At its core was the arresting contention 
that, contr~ry to what had been a .common view, the rise of the large indus-
trial corporation after 1880 was best understood not as a chapter in the 
history of economic; predation, but instead as tile .organizational response 
to technological imperatives and market incentives of a rising managerial 
class.36 
The emergence in the 1880s of the industrial corporation, in conjunction 
with the prior emergence of giant organizations in transportation and com-
munications, was, in Chandler's view, a radically new development with no 
real antecedents in the American past. "Big business"-Chandler's conve-
nient and nonthreatening shorthand for these giant organizations-had 
become so large so fast that it was hardly surprising that it soon become the 
focus of"adversarial" legislation, for example, the Interstate Commerce Act 
(1887) and the Sherman Act (1890). Such legislation establ.ished an enduring 
pattern of challenge and response between "big business" and "big govern-
ment'' that would define the relationship between business and politics in the 
United States from the 1880s until the 1970s-if not beyond.
37 
For Chandler and the historians who followed his lead, the sequencing 
of the rise of giant organizations in the private and public sector best ex-
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plained not oruy why an adversarial relationship between business and poli-
tics emerged m the 1880s but also why it persisted. Only in the United States 
h.ad big business. preceded big government. More than any other single 
Cl!cumstance, this fundamental fact best explained not only why Ameri-
can business executives so often found themselves on trial-or, for that 
matter, why labor relations would prove so contentious-but also, and more 
broadly, why the relationship between business and politics in the United 
States would hereafter remain so much more adversarial than in Europe 
and japan.38 
Chan~er1s thesis became a cornerstone of the "organizational synthesis» 
that one-time coauthor Louis Galambos popularized in a series oflandmark 
essays that clarified its implications for political history. If Chandler were 
right, (;alambos contended, then historians have exaggerated the centrality 
of political ideology in general-and liberalism in particular-as a catalyst 
for change. Modern America, Galambos famously declared, has embarked 
on a rendezvous not with liberalism, but with bureaucracy." 
. Building on Chandler and Galambos, a cohort of historians published 
nchly detailed and analytically sophisticated monographs with titles that 
often included the words "regulation/' "regulating," or "business-crovernment 
relations." Tue priority that these titles gave to ((business" in° "business-
government" relations was revealing: Business led, p~litics (or> more precisely, 
government) followed, and electoral outcomes (whether liberal or conser-
vative, Democratic or Republican) rarely had more than a marginal influence 
on the rules of the game.40 Even in civil rights-or so contended ) ennifer Del-
ton, in a boldly revisionist monograph on corporate employment practices in 
the 1950s and 1960s-big business helped pave the way.'1 
The influence of Chandlerian business history was by no means confined 
to historians. In addition, it inspired a good deal of attention from social 
scientists who challenged Chandler on many issues large and small, yet who 
shared Chandler's interest in the institutional dimensions of economic 
change. Among them were several who leaned decidedly to the left, includ-
ing the historical sociologists Neil Fligstein and William G. Roy, the econo-
mist William Lazonick, and the political scientist Richard Bense!." 
The priority that Chandler accorded business in setting the terms for the 
relationship between big business and big government has sparked a reac-
t10n by several institutionally oriented historians who are impressed by what 
Colleen Dunlavy called the structuring presence of the state." These histo-
rians follow the advice of the historical sociologist Theda Skocpol to "bring 
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the state back in." Unlike Chandler, these historians asked not how the orga-
nizational structure of big business had been shaped by business strategy, 
but instead how business strategy had been shaped by the organizational 
configuration of the state. By the state, they meant not only individual gov-
ernment agencies but also broader institutional arrangements, such as fed:-
eralism, common law, and the separation of powers. The influence of an 
antimonopoly political economy that venerated equal rights and vilified spe~ 
cial privilege on the business strategy of post-Civil War railroad and tele-
graph managers was probed by Richard White and Richard R. John.
44 
For 
each, the political structure not only shaped business strategy but also pro-
vided unscrupulous promoters with a rich menu of options on which they 
readily seized to game the system. Antimonopoly would shape business 
strategy even after the rise of the industrial corporation, explained political 
scientist Gerald Berk in an analysis of "regulated competition" in the 1920s, 
and Shane Hamilton in a monograph on the rise of the post-Second World 
War trucking industry.45 
The willingness of historians to combine the firm-specific internalism of 
the business historian with the comparative institutionalism of the histori-
cal sociologist is a welcome sign that the long isolation ofbusiness history in 
American historiography is coming to an end. To be sure, mu~h remains to 
be done. Political historians too often downplay the operational challenge of 
meeting a payroll and minimize the limitations that even large and well-
known corporations confronted when faced with·new technologies, shifting 
markets, and international competition. By exaggerating the autonomy of 
business leaders, they discount the structural constraints from which no eco-
nomic actor is exempt. No business leader could have prevented the collapse 
of New England's cotton textile industry or the rise of China as a low-cost 
exporter to the United States of a multitude of goods that had once been 
manufactured by American workers, under the supervision of American 
managers, in factories located in the United States.46 
The neglect by political historians of structural constraints on business 
behavior is paralleled by the reluctance of business historians to treat eco-
nomic actors as members of a more-or-less coherent group whose interests 
diverge from those of workers, investors, and other stakeholders. It is for this 
reason that, while business historians routinely emphasize the influence on 
business strategy of technology and markets, they are typically less willing 
to acknowledge the ability of elite-led social movements to subtly (and not 
so subtly) revise the political-economic rules of the game. Too infrequently 
Introduction 13 
do business historians deploy concepts like "elite" and "class"; following the 
2008 economic downturn, even wealth inequality is no longer an issue that 
they can prudently ignore. The political influence of giant organizations 
might well be bad for capitalism, a conclusion that business historians some-
times forget, yet one that was self-evident not only to the proprietary capi-
talists of the 1880s who invented the language and iconography of the modern 
antimonopoly tradition, but also to the institutional economists of the in-
terwar period.47 
Notwithstanding these differences of emphasis, political history and 
bus~ness history have much in common. Each recognizes the importance of 
inst1tut1onal arrangements, or what is once again being called political econ-
omy; each is skeptical of the teleological narratives that once gave shape to 
their fields; and each is committed, either explicitly or implicitly, to the ere-· 
ation of a "trading zone," in which they share methodological insights drawn 
from cultural studies, comparative institutionalism, APD, and state-centered 
social theory, not only with one another but also with kindred spirits work-
10g on related topics in political science and historical sociology. 
* * * 
The essays in this collection build not only on political history, business his- · 
tory, political science, and historical sociology but also on the emerging tra-
dit10n _of historical writing that flies under the banner of the history of . 
. capitahsm.48 The historian of capitalism aspires, as Louis Hyman has ob-
served, to understand the "agency" not only of the many but also of the 
"powerful_ few" who "shaped commerce and industry." To realize this goal, 
. they_ find it advantageous to focus less on social movements headed up by 
outsiders and more on the collective behavior of business leaders: "We ask 
more questions about firms who still have power today) than about move-
ments, who do not .. ; . [T]he historians' task is to confront sober reality, not 
fash10n her01c sagas."' Their goal, Hyman has declared, is to write history 
from the "bottom up, all the w~yto the top.'"' In Hyman's capacious vision, not 
only workers, social activists, and the downtrodden but also the individuals 
who occupkd the most rarefied heights of society-business leaders, govern-
ment admmistrators, policy analysts, even l'he 1 percent-should be dignified 
by historians _as "real" people-rather than as the one-dimensional stick 
figures that they so often became in historical writing in the past. 51 No lon-
ger are social movements automatically presumed to have been protests of 
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the many against injustices perpetrated by the few; for the historian of cap-
italism, it is equally important to recognize that the wealthy and powerful 
have also launched crusades to challenge the prerogatives of the many. 
Tue new history of capitalism is too young to have devised a single over~ 
arching problematique. Yet certain themes recur. Among them are the pri-
ority of institutions over ideas; the power of material circumstances; ~he 
indispensability oflong-term credit for economic development; the evolving 
relationship between :finance, business, labor, and the state; and the mutual 
constitution of the state and the market, an insight that many derive from 
the historical sociology of Karl Polanyi.52 In some ways, these themes are 
new; yet in others, they are venerable indeed. The "language" of ruling and 
subordinate groups was coeval with the founding of the republic, as the labor 
historians Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle observed in 2005 in Ruling Power: 
A History of Wealth and Power in a Democracy, and has informed "one of the 
grand narratives of American history." In fact, it would not be until after the 
Second World War that this language would become supplanted by a dif-
ferent vocabulary that stigmatized analytical categories like "class" and 
"elite" and that reframed American history to downplay the adversarial 
relationship between social groups. Only then would historians devise ex-
planatory schemes that invested agency in "history," the market, or some 
"analogous abstractions.''53 
Much was gained in the process, yet something vital was lost. No linguis-
tic legerdemain could conceal the fundamental fact that the "footprint of 
wealth and power" remained "clearly visible across the whole span of Amer-
ican history." Tue rising prestige of the market deprived the time-honored 
critique of wealth and power of its force, until the time was reached when 
"every overture" to dismantle the apparatus of"public surveillance" over the 
nation's "business system'' was presented by market fundamentalists as a 
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"form ·of emancipation from the tyrannical han o ureaucracy. 
. Tue essays in this collection were written in a similar spirit. Like histori-
ans of capitalism, they paint on a broad canvas, with a particular focus on 
the business elite. Yet their inspiration is broader still: indeed, in various 
ways, and with different results, they build not only on the moral visi~n of 
the political historian and the comparative institutionalism of the business 
historian but also on the path-dependent models of the APD political scien-
tist and the state-centered social theory of the historical sociologist. To high-
light continuities as well as dis.continuities in the relationship between 
business and politics, we have organized these essays both chronologically 
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and thematically. Part I focuses on the Progressive era and the 1920s; Part II 
on the New Deal and the Second World War. Parts III and IV focus on the 
postwar era, which is subdivided into two topics: economic development, 
and liberalism and its critics. · 
Part I features essays by Laura Phillips Sawyer and Daniel Amsterdam 
on the Progressive era and the 1920s; each emphasizes the relationship of 
business and politics to state building and economic development. 
Sawyer shows how corporate executives worked closely with lawmakers 
in 1912 to establish a new trade association, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
Their primary rationale was defensive: troubled by the draconian and seem-
'.ngly arbit'.ary rulings of the Supreme Court in major cases involving the 
interpretation of the antimonopoly Sherman Act, business leaders hoped to 
find a way to better navigate a potentially perilous regulatory environment. 
To help them move forward, the Chamber worked in tandem with an influen-
tial cohort of institutionalist economists to develop for jurists a new, technocratic 
rationale for interfirm cooperation. In so doing, the trade group helped trans-
form into a working partnership a relationship between the courts and the 
business sector that had previously been highly adversarial. 
Amsterdam reveals how in the 1920s the business elite in Detroit and 
Atlanta !Obbied city officials to float huge bond issues to finance public in-
vestments in public works: schools, sewers, libraries, even museums. Eager 
to transform their hometowns intq urban showplaces, business leaders laid 
the foundations for an expansive "civic welfare state." Notwithstanding 
what students might once have been taught in their high school history 
classes, business leaders in the high-flying "roaring twenties" did not reject 
big-government progressivism in favor of small-government conservatism; 
on the contrary, they enthusiastically lobbied for the vigorous augmentation 
of the administrative capacity of city government. In so doing, they built on 
the well-known achievements of the urban planners of the Progressive era 
and prefigured the establishment of the federal welfare state that emerged in 
the New Deal. 
. Part II features essays on the New Deal and the Second World War by 
Enc S. Hintz, Mark R. Wilson, and Richard R. John and Jason Scott Smith. In 
each of these essays, the mid-century business elite confronted powerful ad-
versaries, who obliged them to fashion new, and sometimes disingenuous, 
narratives about the relationship between business and politics. 
. In the first essay, Hintz reconstructs a forgotten chapter in the regulatory 
history of the New Deal: namely, the lobbying campaign organized by the 
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National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) to block patent reform. High-
profile lawsuits involving intellectual property rights often make headlines 
today,· yet few remember that patent reform loomed large on the New Deal 
reform agenda. By mounting a publicity campaign to lionize independent 
inventors as "modern pioneers," NAM forestalled a mandatory cross-licensing 
scheme opposed by both the independent inventor and giant R&D combines 
like General Electric and Bell Labs. 
In the second essay, Wilson demolishes the prevailing stereotype that the 
management of military procurement in the twentieth century has followed 
a single trajectory. In fact, and perhaps not surprisingly-as the military has 
remained throughout American history a very large consumer of government 
investment-the military's procurement methods have changed markedly 
over time. Tue procurement by the military during the Second World War 
of the celebrated "arsenal of democracy" -a project so consequenllal that it 
has Jong been regarded, and not just by military historians, as indispensable 
to the Allied victory over the Nazis-represented a midpoint in a multi-decade 
shift in the military from in-house production to corporate outsourcing. 
Tue war itself was a turning point. Confronted with an increasingly adver-
sarial regulatory burden as the military's pro·curement needs spiked up, cor-
porate executives fought back in a drama of challeng:. and response that 
would parallel the neoliberal turn in the postwar political economy, and, 
conceivably, may have helped to bring it about. . 
In the third essay, John and Smith trace the intellectual trajectory of his-
torian Thomas McCraw, a "dyed-in-the-wool" New Deal Democrat whose 
culturally nuanced comparative institutionalist approach to the history of 
the twentieth-century political economy has already influenced a generatwn 
of policy historians, and has much to teach today's practitioners o~ the "his-
tory of capitalism." Historians have much to learn from McCraw s deft in-
terweaving of history and theory; his critical engagement with the often 
highly ideological discourse of professional economists; and his unabashed 
admiration for the New Dealers' "mixed economy;' a remarkable policy in-
novation that laid the groundwork for the country's astonishing postwar 
economic success. 
Tue final two parts of our collection focus on the postwar era. Part III 
considers the relationship between business and economic development; it 
features essays by Tami J. Friedman, Brent Cebu!, and Elizabeth Tandy 
Shermer. Part IV shifts the focus to business and liberalism, with essays by 
Jennifer Delton, Eric R. Smith, and Pamela Walker Laird. 
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Tue essays by Friedman and Cebu! chart the divergent response of busi-
ness leaders in different parts of the country to the generous federal funding 
that lawmakers earmarked for public investment. Friedman documents the 
sharp divide over economic development that would emerge in the 1950s 
between NAM and certain business leaders in the Northeast:NAM was a na-
tionally oriented trade lobby, which predisposed it to oppose, on free-market 
grounds, the earmarking of federal funding for regions that had been 
adversely affected by plant closings. Northeast manufacturers, in contrast, 
viewed plant closings from a regional perspective and eagerly courted 
federal funding to forestall the seemingly inexorable collapse of a once-
proud manufacturing sector in a region that had long been a cornerstone of 
the nation's industrial heartland. In many cities and towm-and in a decade 
often assumed to have been an economic "golden age"-the-deindustrializa-
tion often associated with the 1970s had already begun. 
Cebu! shows how business leaders in rural Georgia vigorously lobbied for 
federal funding for public works and education, notwithstanding their rep-
utation as reactionary opponents of progressive change. These local business 
elites mobilized what one might call "supply-side liberalism"-with its char-
acteri.stic emphasis on technical assistance, research and development, and 
local infrastructure spending. In so doing, they generated virtually no local 
business opposition in one of the most conservative corners of the land, even 
though their program, which was sharply opposed by nationally oriented 
business organizations such as NAM, would prove to be no less important 
than the better-known Keynesian "demand-side liberalism" in legitimating 
midcentury liberal-state building. 
In the final essay in Part III, Shermer shifts the focus from the Northeast 
to the South and West, and to a sector of the economy-public education-
that, in marked contrast to manufacturing, enjoyed in the postwar period 
rapid and sometimes explosive growth. In Arizona, North Carolina, and 
California.' regional'.y oriented business boosters established a fraught part-
nership w.'th e~ucat10nal administrators and corporate funders to build up 
public un1vers1t1es1 which, for different reasons1 each regarded as essential. 
Business boosters and corporate funders favored technical and professional 
educatwn to foster economic development; academic administrators cham-
pioned the liberal arts to boost their university's prestige. These differences 
were hardly trivial. Yet in light of recent developments in public education, 
even more notable was the existence of a broad-based consensus to fund 
public education and expand the administrative capacity of the state-a 
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consensus that was markedly at variance with the more recent business-
backed critique of public education as an onerous fiscal burden. . 
Part IV of our collection includes three essays on a neglected topic: the 
relationship between business and postwar liberalism. In the first essay, 
Delton illuminates an ideological rift in NAM during the 1950s and 1960s 
that pitted ultraconservatives against moderates. For the ultraconserva-
tives, the only obligation business had was to tur~; profit. The modera~es, 
in contrast, endorsed the idea that business had a social responsibility to 
the public good-an idea that looked backward to the reform agenda that 
the Progressive-era National Civic Federation had championed in the 1910s 
and forward to the Great Society liberalism of the 1960s. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, given NAM's reputation as a reactionary opponent of the New 
Deal, the ultraconservatives lost. The fact that such a contest o:curred 
highlights the persistence in the postwar era of a Progressive-era corpo-
rate ·liberal" mindset in an organization widely regarded as a conservative 
bellwether. In the second essay, Smith reconstructs a little-known chapter in the pro-
test movement that emerged in the 1960s to oppose the continued involve-
ment of the U.S. government in the Vietnam War. The opposition of New 
Left radicals to the war is a textbook perennial, as is the revulsion of antiwar 
radicals at the complicity with the military of many of the nation's lea<Hng 
corporations. Yet relatively little attention has been paid to the small yet in-
fluential cohort of business leaders who led antmar protest groups such as 
the Business Executives Move for Peace (BEM). Smith reconstructs the fas-
cinating and little-known history of this protest group, documenting the 
methods its organizers used to gain public attention, the arguments they ad-
vanced, and the contacts their leaders made with antiwar academics. Unlike 
the decade's better-known protest movements, BEM focused less on the mo-
rality of the war than on its deleterious consequences for the American econ-
omy. The political influence of business-led protest movements such a.s the 
BEM is hard to gauge. Yet it remains suggestive that not only a prominent 
moderate Republican lawmaker but also the radical activist Noam Chom.-
sky opined in print that the United States would not abandon the war until 
an organized bU.siness opposition emerged. . 
In the final essay in this collection, Laird traces the emergence of widely 
accepted ideas and practices concerning equal opportunity for women and 
underrepresented minorities in the corporate workplace. This development 
sometimes anticipated, and in others was powerfully amplified by, the sea 
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change in employment practices that followed the enactment of the land-
m~rk ~ivil Rights Act of 1964. Wary of disgruntled employees, eager to 
mimmize adverse publicity, and fearful of expensive employment discrimi-
~atio~ law~uits, personnel managers responded to the enforcement provi-
sions in this law by taking a variety of ~oncrete steps to boost minority and 
female employment. In so doing, they intensified the entanrrlement of business 
with liberal social reform. By the end of the century, equal ~pportunity, which 
would increasingly come to be associated with the benefits of worlq>lace diver-
sity, would have influential champions not only in the civil rights movement, 
the federal government, and many state govermnents, but also in corporate 
America. · 
* * * 
Although it would be hazardous to venture grand generalizations about 
business and politics on the basis of the essays in this collection, four themes 
stand out. The first theme is the relative modernity of the free-market 
fundamentalism that has become such a prominent feature of economic 
discourse in our own age. Far from being a constant throughout American 
h'.story-or, for that matter, a cardinal tenet of public policy during the 
nmeteenth century, an age that is sometimes mistakenly hailed as the hey-
day oflaissez-fa1re-the radical rejection ofregulatory constraints as incom-
patible with political liberty was first popularized by a small yet purposeful 
group of business leaders opposed on principled grounds to the New Deal. 
Indeed,if one compares the ideological pronouncements of business boosters 
during the New Deal and Second World War with the ideological pronounce-
ments of their counterparts in the Progressive era and the 1920s, then it 
becomes evident, just as specialists in the J:'.rogressive era and the 1920s 
have long contended, that the dominant ethos of the business elite in the 
opening two
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decades of the twentieth century was most emphatically not 
laissez-faire. Even Louis Brandeis upheld in the 1910s a vision of the good 
society that had little in common with the doctrinaire antistatism of not only 
Herbert Spencer but also Friedrich Hayek. The relative balance between gov-
ernment- an~ cont~a~tor-operated navy yards) to cite one relevant example) 
would not shift decmvely from the public to the private sector until after the 
Second World War. 
The second theme is the protean, open-ended, and indeterminate char-
acter of the relationship between business and politics in twentieth-century 
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America. In eleven separate essays, the contributors show how business lead-
ers tried to shape the political-economic rules of the game. Sometimes the 
relationship between business and politics was adversarial; just as often-
indeed, on balance, probably more often-it was not. Some business leaders 
vigorously opposed legislation to empower certain social groups, a phenom-
enon particularly evident in labor relations. Others championed laws and 
regulations to promote economic development, expand the administrative 
capacity of the state, and even advance a liberal social agenda.
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Capital 
gained not only from.a century of favorable laws and regulations but also 
from the shift in the 1930s from a "private" economy (in which the primary 
source of capital for business investment had been the retained earnings of 
corporations and proprietorships) to a "mixed economy" (in which the fed-
eral government had become a major investor).57 The twentieth-century 
American political economy has been very good for business, and the essays 
in this collection attest to this fact. 
Had we featured essays on other themes, we might have struck a different 
balance. In. realms as varied as _taxation, labor-management relations, 
product safety, environmental regulation, health care, and social s_ecurity, 
business leaders have long crusaded to limit state power. It would similarly 
be misleading to assume that the relationship between business leaders and 
politics-the main focus in this collection-paralleled the relationship be-
tween ordinary businesspeople and politics. Had we included essays on im-
migrant entrepreneurs battling city ordinancesor self-employed milliners 
attacking labor laws, the balance might have looked somewhat different. 
Further complications might have arisen had we featured an essay on Prohi-
bition, a remarkably adversarial chapter in the history of the relationship 
between a large and powerful business and the state.58 Even or perhaps espe-
cially in the enforcement of the nation's antitrust laws, conflict rather than 
consensus often prevailed. 
One thing seems incontrovertible: among business leaders, the relation-
ship between business and politics has not been invariably adversarial. For 
much of the twentieth century, much of the nation's business elite lobbied 
for increased public investment and supported the expansion in the adminis-
trative capacity of the state. In some instances, they even backed quintessential 
liberal causes such as the antiwar movement and civil rights. Notwitlistanding 
the opposition of nationally oriented business organizations such as NAM to 
many features of the postwar liberal state-including, in particular, its solici-
tude toward organized labor-large and influential blocs of business leaders 
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proved adept at securing legislation that funneled federal revenue into business 
coffers and expanded the administrative capacity of the state. 
All in all, the range and variety of the realms in which business leaders 
tried to curry favor from lawmakers was little short of astonishing: from mil-
itary procurement, public works, and education, to social activism and civil 
rights. Predictably enough, there were winners and losers. Independent in-
ventors failed to obtain patent reform in the 1930s, having been outgunned 
by better-connected corporate lobbyists. Certain factory owners lobbied for 
federal aid to slow economic decline; others did not. The refusal of Arizona 
business leaders to accept federal funds for education did not preclude them 
from taking money from the Arizona state government. To conclude that 
business leader_s in Detroit and Atlanta in the 1920s opposed, as they most 
emphatically did, the creation of a European-style social welfare state did 
not mean that they also rejected government funding for roads, sewers, 
museums, or libraries. . 
The third theme that the essays in this collection underscore is the wide 
variety of ':"olives that influenced the business elite. It is worth recalling that 
not all business leaders have been political conservatives, while many politi-
cal liberals have been staunch supporters of business. Business leaders have 
been influenced not only or even primarily by the lure for profits or even a 
determination to retain the upper hand (though that was rarely absent). 
Rather, they pursued a variety of goals. "Only economists and Marxists ever 
really believed that capitalism was just about the money," Hyman has 
waggishly observed.59 . Our contributors concur. Just as historians reject 
simple-minded generalizations about ordinary people, so too, do our contrib-
utors refrain from making ex cathedra pronouncements about what business 
leaders have said an_d done. We should be no more surprised that some corpo-
rate executives lobbied to end the Vietnam War than that an influential cohort 
of middle managers continued to champion corporate diversity programs 
even after civil rights had ceased to be a government priority. 
Even on issues ·an which one might assume consensus prevailed, business 
leaders were not always of one mind. Sometimes a difference of opinion 
existed inside a trade group, such as NAM, that historians had often as-
sumed to speak with a single voice. Just because business leaders in upcoun-
try Georgia opposed civil rights legislation does not did not. mean that they 
opposed federal funding for economic development. 
The fourth and final theme that these essays underscore is the value of 
archival research for the ongoing investigation of the relationship between 
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business and politics in the American past. As the essays in this collection 
reveal, an immersion in the sources remains perhaps the best remedy for the 
common presumption that the relationship between business and politics 
followed a single script. If the historians of capitalism have taught us any-
thing, it is that the business elite-no less than lawmakers, social activists, 
and any other influential social group that has attracted the historian's 
attention-should not be treated as cardboard cutouts whose behavior can 
be judged a priori. It is particularly important for today's historians to get 
this right, since, barring some planetwide environmental cataclysm, the 
country's business leaders will remain a powerful protagonist not just in the 
present but also the foreseeable future, wielding vast, though never unlim-
ited, power in the United States and around the world. To hold business lead-
ers accountable for their words and deeds, future historians have an 
obligation, like the contributors to this collection, to probe the relationship 
between business and politics with the same analytical depth, imaginative 
breadth, and critical realism that has long been a defining feature of the his-
torian's craft. 
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